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The Collegium Phaenomenologicum has met in Umbria, Italy every summer since 1976; 
only COVID made it pause, and hopefully only temporarily. It has been a forum for deep 
and broad discussion of  the phenomenological tradition; it has also been a place where that 
tradition has itself  been broadened and deepened by generations of  thinkers who came to 
study the classical texts and to do phenomenology.1 In 2019, over the course of  three weeks 
in July, in three lecture courses, several talks by visiting faculty, twelve text seminars sessions, 
art workshops, and very many informal talks over dinner, on the terrace, and on long walks 
through the town of  Città di Castello and beyond, the Collegium worked on the question 
of  critical phenomenology.
 Planning for the session on Critical Phenomenology began in the summer of  2016 
and, in retrospect, it seems merely obvious that this should be the theme. The term had 
been appearing in monographs and journal articles, in graduate seminars and conference 
presentations, and in conversations here and there on the fringes of  SPEP and other 
meetings. It had emerged in the conversations leading to the founding of  this journal. It 
cropped up where researchers trained in the phenomenological tradition found themselves 
compelled to respond to phenomena that seemed far removed from the intentional objects 
that had featured as examples in the classical texts. Those exemplary lecterns and studies 
were never the most important thing, of  course; they did their work as occasions for 
doing phenomenology, giving neophytes experience of  how it was done and, along the 
way, equipping them with the skills needed for phenomenological practice. If  the logos of  
the phenomenon is a method, then the choice of  phenomenon would seem to be beside 
the point. A piece of  furniture, a hand touching a hand, a mood, an instance of  police 
violence—all could undergo the epoché, all could show themselves from themselves, and all 
could reveal transcendental structures. Why then describe some operations as critical? What 
would be the criteria for defining critical phenomenology?
1 See http://www.collegiumphaenomenologicum.org
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 The compelling objects were sometimes the political—and aesthetic—things that 
the Critical Theory tradition dealt with in terms of  the historical dialectic: instances of  
oppression, injustice, discrimination, and alienation. But concern with the same things did 
not mean that phenomenologists took on the term critical as an attempt at a rapprochement 
between the traditions, but nor was there any sense that this was some sort of  turf  war: 
consciousness for phenomenologists, class consciousness for Left Hegelians. The critical in 
Critical Phenomenology is not simply lifted from Critical Theory, and, though the two traditions 
have abutted and cut across one another since the beginning of  the twentieth century, 
trying to define one in terms of  the other did not move the conversation far.
 Perhaps, more plausibly, the word arrived from the direction of  Critical Race Theory, 
Critical Indigenous Studies, and other fields where the critical turn meant wielding the 
concepts and practices of  the discipline for new purposes. But in those cases, it has been a 
central task to dismantle the discipline itself. Race Theory at least since Arthur de Gobineau 
served as the intellectual justification of  white supremacy; indigenous or Native American 
studies was a means of  extracting a museum-quality archive from living, traumatized 
communities. The first and most continuous object of  study for Critical Race Theory must 
be Race Theory itself, and the question of  the use, abuse, evolution, and emancipatory 
possibilities of  the very thought of  race. Yet phenomenology does not present this sort of  
crisis of  inheritance—Martin Heidegger’s Nazism notwithstanding. The method never did 
calcify into a discipline and, despite Edmund Husserl’s hopes, it did not become a school. 
Specifically, it could never be a self-asserting theoretical position. If  critical phenomenology 
re-purposes the phenomenological tradition, it is not in order to redeem it but to put it to 
work in worldly ways.
 In that case, it has been around for a long time. Frantz Fanon described Black 
experience with world-changing force; Simone de Beauvoir’s description of  the life of  
a woman generated a new language of  resistance, and a feminist mode of  practicing 
phenomenology that has lead the way to today’s critical practices. The plural is important. 
Some confine themselves to descriptions of  first-person experience, in the classical mode. 
Others engage the testimony of  others, or draw on the evidence of  studies and artworks in 
a peri-phenomenological style. Some remain focused on the revelation of  transcendental 
structures as the aim of  phenomenological research, while others, wary of  the power 
relations embedded in transcendental claims, think in terms of  a quasi-transcendental 
move. Some turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty for differentiated embodiment, others to 
Henri Bergson or Husserl for a practice of  hesitation.
 All of  which upsets the project of  definition, and shows the error of  looking for definitive 
criteria. At Collegium 2019, the question “What is critical phenomenology?” was asked 
every day, but every day the conversation had changed. Some felt that we should abandon 
“phenomenology” altogether given its complicated relationship with eternal essences; the 
postcolonial turn of  contemporary philosophy ought to make us suspicious of  any potential 
for hegemonic thinking, and the project of  finding some universal logos of  phenomena was 
outdated and dangerous. Others were committed to phenomenology if  it could remain 
critical, but argued that settling on a specific definition of  critical phenomenology would 
be counterproductive, amounting to a dangerous sort of  gate-keeping that would only limit 
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the possibilities of  thinking-otherwise before it could even get off the ground. Still others 
were more keen to get to work doing critical phenomenology, breathing fresh life into the 
old concepts of  the epoché and intentional arc to articulate some facet of  marginalized 
bodily experience. Instead of  attempting to define critical phenomenology, these thinkers 
reasoned, why don’t we just do it? This was a fruitful path, but the same questions would 
inevitably resurface after discussions of  the specific form of  bodily life under examination: 
But is this really phenomenology? If  this is phenomenology, what makes it immune to the 
universalizing gestures of  “traditional” phenomenology? If  this is not phenomenology, 
then what is it? Is this critical? And, if  so, critical of  what?
 Many began to wonder if  they even knew what phenomenology was. To this end, 
some proposed trying out the limits of  phenomenological inquiry as a productive first step 
towards doing phenomenology critically. To begin this inquiry, some pushed traditional 
thinkers—Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger—to their extreme, using 
these thinkers’ own theoretical claims to dissect their ill-considered examples and candid 
interviews. Others argued for pushing these thinkers aside altogether, letting the spotlight 
shine on thinkers often left outside the traditional canon, narrowly understood: Edith Stein, 
Fanon, Beauvoir, and others. At that point, the question of  method would emerge again. 
Can one think critically with these thinkers who were embedded in a framework that had 
been laid out by men who circled around lecterns and writing desks as their emblematic 
experiences, freely assumed access to the experiences of  colonized others, participated 
in dangerous political parties, and sought universal, transcendental essences? Mustn’t we 
reflect upon the very foundation of  phenomenological inquiry—and, in some cases, reject 
it entirely or rethink it from the ground up—in order to even read these thinkers fairly and 
critically? Positions shifted and changed, and we returned to the drawing board time and 
again, seeking different avenues to the question of  what we were doing when we did critical 
phenomenology.
 The lecture courses would drop bread crumbs along our path. In the first week’s course, 
led by Peg Birmingham and focused on Hannah Arendt, political questions and issues of  
historical perspective came to the fore. Peg Birmingham prompted discussions on what it 
means to think and act politically, and how these political experiences form spaces, generate 
worlds, and carry us forward. In the second week, Alia Al-Saji pressed on the most common 
reading of  Fanon, which places him within a Husserlian, or sometimes Merleau-Pontian, 
framework. We all saw Fanon as if  for the first time, attempting to grapple with the richness 
of  his thought and the affective force of  his writing on its own terms instead of  trying to 
tease it apart using familiar concepts. Finally, in the third week, Matthias Fritsch asked us to 
question the lineage of  phenomenology, returning to basic questions of  deconstruction and 
critique: is Jacques Derrida a phenomenologist? Does he perform a critical phenomenology 
using Heidegger’s work, or is he critical of  Heidegger’s thinking?
 The courses, lectures, seminars and long evenings philosophizing over dinner and wine 
produced an atmosphere buzzing with curiosity and debate. A moment came when, all at 
once, everyone had a passionate stance on what phenomenology is and how it might be 
critical, but everyone also felt compelled to continue to play with the ideas and question 
their most deeply-held assumptions. A matrix of  different strategies and arguments began 
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to weave in the course of  the shared conversation, one without discernible end or beginning. 
A few points of  agreement held it to the ground and in common—that phenomenology 
can be fruitful endeavor and that phenomenology ought to look forward to a more inclusive 
future. But what this might look like, how it ought to be done, and whether or not it was 
already being done remained up for discussion. In true phenomenological fashion, it felt as 
though the conversation had to, time and again, start again from the beginning.
 Perhaps the ultimate lesson, then, is that we ought not settle on or settle for a definitive, 
exhaustive criterion for critical phenomenology, though we also mustn’t give up the search. 
We should remain vigilant in reflecting upon our thinking, not in order to police the borders 
of  phenomenology to ensure it remains healthily critical (or, indeed, pure and immutable), 
but in order to maintain good thinking and fresh perspectives. If  we never consider 
what we are doing and what to call it, we risk falling into familiar patterns of  thought 
or unwittingly treading on another’s familiar territory. Yet if  we cling to our discipline’s 
goal as to a creed, we foreclose new opportunities for thinking—thinking harder, thinking 
better. The tensions that arise around method, the discipline’s history, and how to grasp 
one’s own epistemological position are all productive tensions. As Arendt puts it, what is 
important is to keep thought in motion. Academic fields can ossify into dusty artifacts of  
university life, outmoded technologies of  knowledge with overreaching assumptions and 
troublesome blind spots. Conversations like these—the ones carried out at the Collegium, 
the ones carried on in this volume, the ones between disciplines and between the academy 
and the wider world—are what ensure that the dust is not allowed to settle. We welcome 
you to engage the works of  this volume, written by both faculty and students who worked to 
define critical phenomenology at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in 2019, to continue 
this shared task of  unsettling and building together.
